

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin

Vol. XLIV, No. 1137

April 10, 1961

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Foreign Aid

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ¹

To the Congress of the United States:

This Nation must begin any discussion of "foreign aid" in 1961 with the recognition of three facts:

1. Existing foreign aid programs and concepts are largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for our needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world as it enters the sixties.

2. The economic collapse of those free but less-developed nations which now stand poised between sustained growth and economic chaos would be disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive to our conscience.

3. There exists, in the 1960's, a historic opportunity for a major economic assistance effort by the free industrialized nations to move more than half the people of the less-developed nations into self-sustained economic growth, while the rest move substantially closer to the day when they, too, will no longer have to depend on outside assistance.

I

Foreign aid—America's unprecedented response to world challenges—has not been the work of one party or one administration. It has moved forward under the leadership of two great Presidents—Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower—and drawn its support from forward-looking members of both political parties in the Congress and throughout the Nation.

Our first major foreign aid effort was an emergency program of relief—of food and clothing and shelter—to areas devastated by World War II. Next we embarked on the Marshall plan—a tower-

ing and successful program to rebuild the economies of Western Europe and prevent a Communist takeover. This was followed by point 4—an effort to make scientific and technological advances available to the people of developing nations. And recently the concept of development assistance, coupled with the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], has opened the door to a united free world effort to assist the economic and social development of the less-developed areas of the world.

To achieve this new goal we will need to renew the spirit of common effort which lay behind our past efforts—we must also revise our foreign aid organization, and our basic concepts of operation to meet the new problems which now confront us.

For no objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing program—actually a multiplicity of programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent, and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes. Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad.

The program requires a highly professional skilled service, attracting substantial numbers of high-caliber men and women capable of sensitive dealing with other governments, and with a deep understanding of the process of economic development. However, uncertainty and declining public prestige have all contributed to a fall in the morale and efficiency of those employees in

¹ H. Doc. 117, 87th Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on Mar. 22.

the field who are repeatedly frustrated by the delays and confusions caused by overlapping agency jurisdictions and unclear objectives. Only the persistent efforts of those dedicated and hard-working public servants, who have kept the program going, managed to bring some success to our efforts overseas.

In addition, uneven and undependable short-term financing has weakened the incentive for the long-term planning and self-help by the recipient nations which are essential to serious economic development. The lack of stability and continuity in the program—the necessity to accommodate all planning to a yearly deadline—when combined with a confusing multiplicity of American aid agencies within a single nation abroad—have reduced the effectiveness of our own assistance and made more difficult the task of setting realistic targets and sound standards. Piecemeal projects, hastily designed to match the rhythm of the fiscal year are no substitute for orderly long-term planning. The ability to make long-range commitments has enabled the Soviet Union to use its aid program to make developing nations economically dependent on Russian support—thus advancing the aims of world communism.

Although our aid programs have helped to avoid economic chaos and collapse, and assisted many nations to maintain their independence and freedom—nevertheless, it is a fact that many of the nations we are helping are not much nearer sustained economic growth than they were when our aid operation began. Money spent to meet crisis situations or short-term political objectives while helping to maintain national integrity and independence has rarely moved the recipient nation toward greater economic stability.

II

In the face of these weaknesses and inadequacies—and with the beginning of a new decade of new problems—it is proper that we draw back and ask with candor a fundamental question: Is a foreign aid program really necessary? Why should we not lay down this burden which our Nation has now carried for some 15 years?

The answer is that there is no escaping our obligations: our moral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations—our economic obligations as the wealthiest people in a world of largely

poor people, as a nation no longer dependent upon the loans from abroad that once helped us develop our own economy—and our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom.

To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous; and, in the long run, more expensive. For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area. Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperiled. A program of assistance to the underdeveloped nations must continue because the Nation's interest and the cause of political freedom require it.

We live at a very special moment in history. The whole southern half of the world—Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence and modernizing their old ways of life. These new nations need aid in loans and technical assistance just as we in the northern half of the world drew successively on one another's capital and know-how as we moved into industrialization and regular growth.

But in our time these new nations need help for a special reason. Without exception they are under Communist pressure. In many cases, that pressure is direct and military. In others, it takes the form of intense subversive activity designed to break down and supersede the new—and often frail—modern institutions they have thus far built.

But the fundamental task of our foreign aid program in the 1960's is not negatively to fight communism: Its fundamental task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the 20th century, as in the 19th—in the southern half of the globe as in the north—economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand.

In short we have not only obligations to fulfill, we have great opportunities to realize. We are, I am convinced, on the threshold of a truly united and major effort by the free industrialized nations to assist the less-developed nations on a long-term basis. Many of these less-developed nations are on the threshold of achieving sufficient economic, social, and political strength and self-sustained growth to stand permanently on their own feet. The 1960's can be—and must be—the crucial “decade of development”—the period when many less-

developed nations make the transition into self-sustained growth—the period in which an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations can reduce world tensions and insecurity. This goal is in our grasp if, and only if, the other industrialized nations now join us in developing with the recipients a set of commonly agreed criteria, a set of long-range goals, and a common undertaking to meet those goals, in which each nation's contribution is related to the contributions of others and to the precise needs of each less-developed nation. Our job, in its largest sense, is to create a new partnership between the northern and southern halves of the world, to which all free nations can contribute, in which each free nation must assume a responsibility proportional to its means.

We must unite the free industrialized nations in a common effort to help those nations within reach of stable growth get underway. And the foundation for this unity has already been laid by the creation of the OECD under the leadership of President Eisenhower. Such a unified effort will help launch the economies of the newly developing countries "into orbit"—bringing them to a stage of self-sustained growth where extraordinary outside assistance is not required. If this can be done—and I have every reason to hope it can be done—then this decade will be a significant one indeed in the history of freemen.

But our success in achieving these goals, in creating an environment in which the energies of struggling peoples can be devoted to constructive purposes in the world community—and our success in enlisting a greater common effort toward this end on the part of other industrialized nations—depends to a large extent upon the scope and continuity of our own efforts. If we encourage recipient countries to dramatize a series of short-term crises as a basis for our aid—instead of depending on a plan for long-term goals—then we will dissipate our funds, our good will and our leadership. Nor will we be any nearer to either our security goals or to the end of the foreign aid burden.

In short, this Congress at this session must make possible a dramatic turning point in the troubled history of foreign aid to the underdeveloped world. We must say to the less-developed nations, if they are willing to undertake

necessary internal reform and self-help—and to the other industrialized nations, if they are willing to undertake a much greater effort on a much broader scale—that we then intend during this coming decade of development to achieve a decisive turnaround in the fate of the less-developed world, looking toward the ultimate day when all nations can be self-reliant and when foreign aid will no longer be needed.

However, this will not be an easy task. The magnitude of the problems is staggering. In Latin America, for example, population growth is already threatening to outpace economic growth—and in some parts of the continent living standards are actually declining. In 1945 the population of our 20 sister American Republics was 145 million. It is now greater than that of the United States, and by the year 2000, less than 40 years away, Latin American population will be 592 million, compared with 312 million for the United States. Latin America will have to double its real income in the next 30 years simply to maintain already low standards of living. And the problems are no less serious or demanding in the other developing areas of the world. Thus to bring real economic progress to Latin America and to the rest of the less-developed world will require a sustained and united effort on the part of the Latin American Republics, the United States, and our free world allies.

This will require leadership, by this country in this year. And it will require a fresh approach—a more logical, efficient, and successful long-term plan—for American foreign aid. I strongly recommend to the Congress the enactment of such a plan, as contained in a measure to be sent shortly to the Congress and described below.

III

If our foreign aid funds are to be prudently and effectively used, we need a whole new set of basic concepts and principles:

1. Unified administration and operation—a single agency in Washington and the field, equipped with a flexible set of tools, in place of several competing and confusing aid units.

2. Country plans—a carefully thought through program tailored to meet the needs and the resource potential of each individual country, in-

stead of a series of individual, unrelated projects. Frequently, in the past, our development goals and projects have not been undertaken as integral steps in a long-range economic development program.

3. Long-term planning and financing—the only way to make meaningful and economical commitments.

4. Special emphasis on development loans repayable in dollars—more conducive to business-like relations and mutual respect than sustaining grants or loans repaid in local currencies, although some instances of the latter are unavoidable.

5. Special attention to those nations most willing and able to mobilize their own resources, make necessary social and economic reforms, engage in long-range planning, and make the other efforts necessary if these are to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth.

6. Multilateral approach—a program and level of commitments designed to encourage and complement an increased effort by other industrialized nations.

7. A new agency with new personnel—drawing upon the most competent and dedicated career servants now in the field, and attracting the highest quality from every part of the Nation.

8. Separation from military assistance—our program of aid to social and economic development must be seen on its own merits, and judged in the light of its vital and distinctive contribution to our basic security needs.

IV

I propose that our separate and often confusing aid programs be integrated into a single administration embracing the present Washington and field operations of—

A. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and all its technical assistance (point 4) and other programs;

B. The Development Loan Fund (DLF);

C. The food-for-peace program (Public Law 480) in its relations with other countries, while also recognizing its essential role in our farm economy;

D. The local currency lending activities of the Export-Import Bank;

E. The Peace Corps, recognizing its distinctive

contribution beyond the area of economic development;

F. The donation of nonagricultural surpluses from other national stockpiles of excess commodities or equipment;

G. All other related staff and program services now provided by the Department of State as well as ICA.

The fieldwork in all these operations will be under the direction of a single mission chief in each country reporting to the American ambassador. This is intended to remove the difficulty which the aided countries and our own field personnel sometimes encounter in finding the proper channel of decision making. Similarly, central direction and final responsibility in Washington will be fixed in an administrator of a single agency—reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the President—working through Washington directors for each major geographical area, and through the directors of the constituent resource units whose functions are drawn together in each national plan: a development lending organization, food-for-peace, the Peace Corps, and a unit for technical and other assistance stressing education and human resources—initiating a program of research, development, and scientific evaluation to increase the effectiveness of our aid effort; and, in addition, the Secretary of State will coordinate with economic aid the military assistance program administered by the Department of Defense, the related operations of the Export-Import Bank, and the role of the United States in the Inter-American Fund for Social Progress, and activities of international organizations.

Under the jurisdiction of both the Secretary of State in Washington and the ambassadors in the field, foreign aid can more effectively play its part as an effective instrument of our overall efforts for world peace and security. The concentration of responsibilities and increased status will both require and attract high-caliber personnel. Programs such as the Peace Corps and food-for-peace, far from being submerged, will be used more effectively and their distinctive identity and appeal preserved—and food-for-peace will continue to be based on availabilities determined by the Department of Agriculture.

But I am not proposing merely a reshuffling and relabeling of old agencies and their personnel,

without regard to their competence. I am recommending the replacement of these agencies with a new one—a fresh start under new leadership.

V

But new organization is not enough. We need a new working concept.

At the center of the new effort must be national development programs. It is essential that the developing nations set for themselves sensible targets; that these targets be based on balanced programs for their own economic, educational, and social growth—programs which use their own resources to the maximum. If planning assistance is required, our own aid organization will be prepared to respond to requests for such assistance, along with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international and private institutions. Thus, the first requirement is that each recipient government seriously undertake to the best of its ability on its own those efforts of resource mobilization, self-help, and internal reform—including land reform, tax reform, and improved education and social justice—which its own development requires and which would increase its capacity to absorb external capital productively.

These national development programs—and the kind of assistance the free world provides—must be tailored to the recipients' current stage of development and their foreseeable potential. A large infusion of development capital cannot now be absorbed by many nations newly emerging from a wholly underdeveloped condition. Their primary need at first will be the development of human resources, education, technical assistance, and the groundwork of basic facilities and institutions necessary for further growth. Other countries may possess the necessary human and material resources to move toward status as developing nations, but they need transitional assistance from the outside to enable them to mobilize those resources and move into the more advanced stage of development where loans can put them on their feet. Still others already have the capacity to absorb and effectively utilize substantial investment capital.

Finally, it will be necessary, for the time being, to provide grant assistance to those nations that are hard pressed by external or internal pressure so that they can meet those pressures and main-

tain their independence. In such cases it will be our objective to help them, as soon as circumstances permit, make the transition from instability and stagnation to growth; shifting our assistance as rapidly as possible from a grant to a development loan basis. For our new program should not be based merely on reaction to Communist threats or short-term crises. We have a positive interest in helping less-developed nations provide decent living standards for their people and achieve sufficient strength, self-respect, and independence to become self-reliant members of the community of nations. And thus our aid should be conditioned on the recipients' ability and willingness to take the steps necessary to reach that goal.

To meet the varied needs of many nations, the new aid administration will have a flexible set of tools, coordinated and shaped to fit each national development program: the grant or sale (for either local currency or dollars with special repayment terms) of surplus foods, equipment and other items; technical assistance; skilled manpower from the Peace Corps; development grants; transitional, sustaining, or emergency grants; development loans repayable in local currency; and development loans repayable in dollars, with special terms of repayment that will meet the needs of the recipient country. These tools will be co-ordinated with the activities of the Export-Import Bank, and with loan and investment guarantees to private enterprise.

The instrument of primary emphasis—the single most important tool—will be long-term development loans at low or no rates of interest, repayable in dollars, and designed to promote growth in those less-developed nations which have a real chance for ultimate self-reliance but which lack the ability to service loans from normal lending institutions. The terms of repayment will vary from as long as 50 years for those countries just starting on the road to development, to a much shorter period of time for those countries that are nearing the stage of self-sufficient growth.

Such long-term loans are preferable to outright grants, or "soft loans" repayable in local currencies that are of little benefit to the American taxpayer. The emphasis on law or interest-free loans is not designed to undercut other institutions. The objective is to rely on flexibility in the

repayment period and the requirement of ultimate dollar repayment for insuring strict accountancy while meeting individual needs in an area not met by suppliers of capital on normal terms.

Lending on these terms is not normal banking practice. We are banking on the emergence over coming years and decades of a group of independent, growing, self-reliant nations.

VI

A program based on long-range plans instead of short-run crises cannot be financed on a short-term basis. Long-term authorization, planning, and financing are the key to the continuity and efficiency of the entire program. If we are unwilling to make such a long-term commitment, we cannot expect any increased response from other potential donors or any realistic planning from the recipient nations.

I recommend, therefore, an authorization for the new aid agency of not less than 5 years, with borrowing authority also for 5 years to commit and make dollar repayable loans within the limits spelled out below. No other step would be such a clear signal of our intentions to all the world. No other step would do more to eliminate the restrictions and confusions which have rendered the current foreign aid program so often ineffective. No other step would do more to help obtain the service of top-flight personnel. And in no other way can we encourage the less-developed nations to make a sustained national effort over a long-term period.

For, if we are to have a program designed to brighten the future, that program must have a future. Experience has shown that long-range needs cannot be met evenly and economically by a series of 1-year programs. Close consultation and cooperation with the Congress and its committees will still be essential, including an annual review of the program.

And we will still need annual appropriations of those amounts needed to meet requirements for which dollar repayable loans would be unsuitable. These appropriations should be available until spent in order to avoid any wasteful rush to oblige funds at the end of a fiscal year.

The new continuity and flexibility this kind of long-term authority will bring cannot help but result in more productive criteria, a greater effort

on the part of the developing nations, greater contributions from our more prosperous allies, more solid results, and real longrun economy to the taxpayers. The new emphasis on long-term plans and realistic targets will give both the Congress and the Executive a better basis for evaluating the validity of our expenditures and progress.

VII

A long-term program and borrowing authority, even though limited, will enable us to demonstrate the seriousness of our intentions to other potential donors and to the less-developed world. Over the next 5 years, the economic program here proposed, together with an expanded food-for-peace program as recommended in my agricultural message,² and project loans by the Export-Import Bank, will constitute direct U.S. economic assistance activity of considerable magnitude.

It will, however, take time to institute the new concepts and practices which are proposed. Thus, during this initial year, while we will need to make the necessary long-term commitments for development lending, it is unnecessary to ask the Congress for any additional funds for this year's program.

Consequently, while the funds requested by my predecessor will be sharply shifted in terms of their use and purpose, I am asking the Congress for a total foreign aid budget of new obligational authority no greater than that requested in the rockbottom budget previously submitted (\$4 billion)³ despite the fact that the number of new nations needing assistance is constantly increasing; and, though increasing such authority for nonmilitary aid while reducing military assistance, this budget provides for a level of actual expenditures on nonmilitary aid no greater than reflected in the previous budget (\$1.9 billion). (These figures do not, of course, reflect Public Law 480 operations.)

In deciding on this program, I have also carefully considered its impact on our balance of payments. We are now putting maximum emphasis, in both our development lending and grant aid programs, on the procurement of goods and services of U.S. origin. As I pointed out in my

² H. Doc. 100, 87th Cong., 1st sess.

³ H. Doc. 15, 87th Cong., 1st sess.

message on the balance of payments,⁴ under present procedures not more than 20 percent of foreign economic aid expenditures will affect our balance of payments. This means that approximately \$2 billion out of the requested \$2.4 billion in economic aid will be spent directly for goods and services benefiting the American economy.

This is important. For not only do we have the highest gross national product, both total and per capita, of any country in the world, thus making clear both our obligations and our capacity to do our full part, but we are currently underutilizing our great economic capacity because of economic recession and slack. Less than 80 percent of our industrial capacity is now in use, and nearly 7 percent of our labor force is unemployed. Under these circumstances cutbacks in the foreign aid program would be felt not only in loss of economic progress and hope abroad but in loss of markets and income for business, labor, and agriculture at home.

In short, this program will not in whole or in part unbalance the previous budget in any fashion. Its impact on our balance of payments will be marginal. And its benefits for our domestic economy should not be overlooked.

The \$4 billion previously requested for fiscal year 1962 will be reallocated under this new program as follows:

Military assistance will be reduced from the \$1.8 billion requested to \$1.6 billion, as discussed below.

Economic assistance, with a much greater portion going to development loans, a small increase in development grants, and a reduction in sustaining grants, will total \$2.4 billion.

Of this, \$1.5 billion will be contained in the usual annual appropriation of new obligational authority to finance the part of the program that is not suitable for dollar development loans: grants for education, social progress and institutional development, the Peace Corps, and sustaining aid. Nine hundred million dollars will be available for long-term low or interest-free development loans to be repaid in dollars, financed through an authorization of public debt borrowing authority which would also provide no more than \$1.6 billion for each of the succeeding 4 years. Also to be

made available for such loans under the new system of full coordination will be the unappropriated dollar funds now coming in in repayment of the principal and interest on certain previous loans to foreign governments (United Kingdom, ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration], GAR-IOA [Government and Relief in Occupied Areas], and others—but not the Export-Import Bank).

VIII

The economic programs I am recommending in this message cannot succeed without peace and order. A vital element toward such stability is assurance of military strength sufficient to protect the integrity of these emerging nations while they are advancing to higher and more adequate levels of social and economic well-being.

I shall therefore request the Congress to provide at this time \$1.6 billion for provision of military assistance. This figure is the amount required to meet the U.S. share in maintaining forces that already exist, and to honor firm existing commitments for the future.

I am frank to say that we cannot now say with precision whether this amount will meet the minimum level of military aid which our basic security policy might demand this year. The emergence of new crises or new conflicts may require us to make an even greater effort.

However, while I have mentioned in this message the amount to be allocated to military assistance, those funds, while coordinated with the policies of the new agency, will not be administered by it and should not be included in its appropriation. In order to make clear the peaceful and positive purposes of this program, to emphasize the new importance this administration places on economic and social development quite apart from security interests, and to make clear the relation between the military assistance program and those interests, I shall propose a separate authorization for military assistance with appropriations as part of the defense budget. Moreover, to the extent that world security conditions permit, military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize the internal security, civil works, and economic growth of the nations thus aided. By this shift in emphasis, we mean no lessening of our determination to oppose local aggression wherever it may occur. We have demonstrated our will and

⁴ BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

ability to protect free world nations—if they so desire—from the type of external threat with which many of them are still confronted. We will not fall short on this.

IX

The levels on which this new program is based are the minimum resulting from a hard reappraisal of each type of assistance and the needs of the less-developed world. They demonstrate both to the less-developed nations and to the other industrialized nations that this country will meet its fair share of effort necessary to accomplish the desired objective, and their effort must be greater as well. These are the rockbottom minimum of funds necessary to do the job. To provide less would be wasteful, perhaps more wasteful, than to provide more. Certainly it would be wasteful to the security interest of the free world.

But I am hopeful that the Congress will not provide less. Assistance to our fellow nations is a responsibility which has been willingly assumed and fashioned by two great Presidents in the past, one from each party—and it has been supported by the leaders of both parties in both Houses who recognized the importance of our obligations.

I believe the program which I have outlined is both a reasonable and sensible method of meeting those obligations as economically and effectively as possible. I strongly urge its enactment by the Congress, in full awareness of the many eyes upon us—the eyes of other industrialized nations, awaiting our leadership for a stronger united effort—the eyes of our adversaries, awaiting the weakening of our resolve in this new area of international struggle—the eyes of the poorer peoples of the world, looking for hope and help, and needing an incentive to set realistic long-range goals—and, finally, the eyes of the American people, who are fully aware of their obligations to the sick, the poor, and the hungry, wherever they may live. Thus, without regard to party lines, we shall take this step not as Republicans or as Democrats but as leaders of the free world. It will both befit and benefit us to take this step boldly. For we are launching a decade of development on which will depend, substantially, the kind of world in which we and our children shall live.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 22, 1961.*

United States Ratifies OECD Convention

White House press release dated March 23

Following is a statement made by President Kennedy on March 23 announcing the ratification on that day of the convention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.¹

In behalf of the United States I have ratified the convention establishing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. I have done so with great satisfaction and with expectations that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will become one of the principal institutions through which we pursue the great aim of consolidating the Atlantic Community. As I said in my inaugural address,²

United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do—for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

In giving its advice and consent to this act of ratification, the United States Senate has affirmed the intention of the United States to enter upon a new era of cooperative enterprise with our Atlantic partners. We face a broad spectrum of common economic problems. And OECD should prove a useful forum in which the member states can consider and act together on a number of the vital questions.

Among these challenging problems, none is more urgent than that of helping the less developed countries in their quest for economic growth and stability. The countries represented in OECD have a common interest and a common responsibility in this task. For they are among those fortunate enough to have earned the capital and the skills required for such programs. And they share with all humanity the hope and determination that the less developed peoples will succeed in their valiant efforts to achieve sustained economic progress.

Next week the Development Assistance Group, which is soon to become the Development Assist-

¹ For background and text of convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 8; for statements by Under Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, see *ibid.*, Mar. 6, 1961, p. 326.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

ance Committee of the OECD, will meet in London. As an indication of the importance I attach to all phases of the work of OECD, I have instructed George W. Ball, our Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to represent the United States at this meeting.

The subject matter of this meeting represents

one of the central tasks of OECD. I look forward to the development of joint approaches, and joint solutions, in which each of the member countries will assume its fair share of our common responsibility. I am confident that this meeting will represent a substantial forward step in this effort.

Charter Day Address

by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a great privilege for me to take part in the Charter Day exercises of the University of California at Berkeley. I have done so before, in between pitching pennies at the step of Boalt Hall, and am one who has watched the university's rise to the front ranks of world universities with pride and admiration. You have combined here a passion for excellence, the strong support of your governors and legislators, and the affection of the people of this State to build a university system which adds luster to California and draws upon you the responsibilities which result from your capacity to contribute. I could not be here without a word of appreciation for the many roles you are playing in strengthening our relations with the peoples of other lands and cultures.

When I arrived in Washington to assume my new responsibilities, I found that my colleagues in the Department of State had thoughtfully prepared a briefing book on the "major issues" in foreign policy which the new administration would face. It was 3 inches thick. A *tour d'horizon* of the world scene shows every continent filled with complex situations engaging our national interest and attention; boredom is not to be our problem.

At this great university I have presumed to

think that you might be interested in hearing what seem to me to be some of the underlying questions which throw light upon the specific situations that fill the headlines. My purpose in these brief remarks will be not to describe the jungle but to try to point to some trails through it, not to create new headlines but to make a modest contribution to understanding.

An Era of Change

One of the first of these questions is how we shall relate ourselves to the far-reaching changes which mark our period of history. I have commented on this before and shall do so again and again. For vast readjustments are taking place, no less significant than was the explosion of Europe into other continents in the 15th to 19th centuries. The idea of national independence is in crescendo and may not run its course until we have at least 120 sovereign states in the community of nations.

In the other direction national states are acting together to reduce the meaning of their national boundaries through international arrangements of a regional or universal character to handle problems which cannot be solved by single states acting alone. The sharper edges of sovereignty are being blunted by voluntary action to meet practical necessity and gain reciprocal practical advantage. Today, March 20, for example, there are

¹ Made at the Charter Day exercises at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 20 (press release 146).

more than 10 international conferences in progress in some part of the world at which the United States is officially represented. The same occurs on every working day throughout the year. There is emerging, steadily but largely unnoticed, what a distinguished jurist has called the "common law of mankind."

In vast areas of the world peoples who have lived in misery have discovered that hunger, disease, and ignorance are not a part of an inescapable environment but that something can be done about them. The so-called "revolution of rising expectations" is real, and governments which do not respond with vigorous effort cannot hope to survive.

Reaching out for domination in the midst of these changes is a Communist world which is bringing large resources and renewed energy to the extension of its controls in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It would be a mistake for us to underestimate the formidable contest in which we shall be engaged in the decade of the sixties.

But the underlying forces producing change are familiar. To state them simply, they are a quest for freedom—national and individual—a groping for a rule of law, and a yearning for economic and social improvement. So identified, our relation to them becomes clear. They are congenial forces, rooted in ideas upon which we have built our own nation, a striving which has been a part of our own struggle, aspirations which we share with human beings in all parts of the world.

Our own role cannot be passive; nor can we afford merely an active defense of the *status quo*. The United States, indeed Western democracy, must take the lead in building a world in which men can be free under law and in which the human spirit will not be subdued by hunger, disease, and despair. We cannot stand aside from the revolutionary forces which we ourselves helped to nourish if we wish our own great experiment in freedom to thrive.

Resolving Conflicts Through International Action

A second large question before us is whether the community of nations can forge the international instruments we must have to resolve conflicts and make cooperation more effective. I am skeptical when I hear that one or another crisis will

"decide the fate of the United Nations." Man's hopes for peace will not be so lightly surrendered. But there are times of testing when we learn whether we are moving ahead or slipping backward. The success of the United Nations effort in the Congo is such a test. There the United Nations has been asked to bring order out of chaos, to assist the Congolese to get their house in good array, to provide financial and administrative assistance until the human and material resources of the country are mobilized, and to protect the Congo from interferences from the outside which would frustrate both the wishes of the Congolese and the principles of the charter.

It is not my present purpose to enter into the Congolese part of the problem but to draw your attention to the effort to deal with it by international action. The first requirement has been to determine a United Nations policy. Executive agents cannot act effectively unless they know what they are expected to accomplish; armed forces need to be clear about their mission. The determination of policy is, of course, a political process and involves the adjustment of diverse views among those who come to the table. A clear mandate cannot issue from the Security Council or from the General Assembly unless members are willing to agree upon a policy—to reduce the variety of national policies to an understandable and consistent policy for the United Nations itself. The United States supported the most recent Security Council resolution on the Congo² not because we thought it was perfect but because we believed it to be a useful improvement upon the previous uncertain mandate.

A second requirement has been the furnishing of troops at the call of the Secretary-General on behalf of the United Nations. In such situations time is of the essence and a ready response is critical. Upon arrival such forces must come under United Nations command and policy, for if the several contingents should act upon national directives utter confusion could result. If, for reasons which seem sufficient to the governments concerned, particular contingents have to be withdrawn, the United Nations should be given considerable discretion as to time and circumstances. While we can be grateful to those countries who furnished troops in full cooperation with the

² For background and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359.

United Nations, experience in the Congo suggests that we must turn once more to the possibility of constituting a permanent United Nations Force, specifically trained and equipped, held in readiness for immediate use.

A United Nations responsibility in a country like the Congo is an expensive operation; it requires money, and in large amounts. The effort cannot succeed unless member governments put aside their particular views and provide the resources properly levied by the General Assembly. These are admittedly burdensome, but conflict is more so, and we are talking about the maintenance of peace. If the United States has thus far assumed more than its share of United Nations costs in the Congo, it is because we believe that United Nations presence and action in that country must not fail because of the financial defaults of some of its members; its failure would involve heavier burdens more costly still.

Recent attacks upon the Secretary-General and proposals to substitute a triumvirate for a single executive agent must be looked upon as an attempt to reduce the United Nations to ineffectiveness. The United States cannot accept so serious an undermining of the agreements and purposes of the charter. We have committed ourselves to the United Nations as an indispensable instrument of peace. But if it is important to us, so it is to the generality of its membership who must look to it for their safety and for attention to their interests in a turbulent world. The United Nations must accomplish its task in the Congo both because of the Congo and because it must ready itself for other, as yet unidentified, crises in the years ahead, where effective international action may be the difference between war and peace.

Dealing With Cold-War Issues

A third of the larger questions before us is how we are to deal with the issues commonly called the cold war. The cold war was not invented in the West; it was born in the assault upon freedom which arose out of the ashes of World War II. We might have hoped that the fires of that struggle might have consumed ambitions to dominate others and that, at long last, man might have established his relations on the law of the charter. But such has not been the case. The issues called the cold war are real and cannot be merely wished away. They must be faced and met. But how

we meet them makes a difference. They will not be scolded away by invective nor frightened away by bluster. They must be met with determination, confidence, and sophistication. Unnecessary or pointless irritations should be removed; channels of communication should be kept open to make it the more possible to find points at which tension might be relieved. Our discussion, public or private, should be marked by civility; our manners should conform to our own dignity and power and to our good repute throughout the world. But our purposes and policy must be clearly expressed to avoid miscalculation or an underestimation of our determination to defend the cause of freedom.

Perhaps most important of all, we should keep our eyes on the world beyond the cold war, the world we see when men come to their senses, the world which men have dreamed about for centuries. For, in building that world, we shall have friends in all parts of the earth, we shall find strength in the very nature of man, we shall share purposes which make natural allies of us all. If defending freedom is to be called waging the cold war, then wage it we must, but we would prefer to bring it to an end. For we look forward to a time when contest will be unnecessary because the freedom of man will be firmly established.

The Problem of Disarmament

A fourth central question is whether we cannot now move realistically toward disarmament. The dismal history of man's attempts to lay down his arms and to live in peace is not encouraging. I suppose there is no subject to which I have given more personal attention during my adult years than to this. I sympathize with those who look upon disarmament negotiations as an elaborate minuet. But we dare not yield to cynicism or despair. The burden of arms is staggering, and the very nature of modern weapons adds to general tension. We must try again, with imagination, prudence, and persistence, to move from endless discussion to practical steps—small steps if necessary, large steps if possible.

Tomorrow the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union will resume negotiations at Geneva on a treaty to ban the testing of nuclear weapons. President Kennedy has instructed our delegation, led by Mr. Arthur Dean, to enter these talks with great seriousness of pur-

pose.³ A treaty which succeeds in halting nuclear tests under adequate inspection and control might not in itself represent a major step in the reduction of arms, but it would be a first and a most significant one. We very much hope that all others at the table will recognize the pregnant meaning of success in this effort and bring to the talks a resolve to reach a prompt and reasonable conclusion.

Meanwhile our study of general disarmament problems moves ahead under the leadership of Mr. John J. McCloy and our Disarmament Administration. There is no need to repeat here the several proposals which various nations have contributed to recent disarmament discussion. The matter needs a fresh and imaginative review by all concerned. There can be no doubt about the readiness of the United States to work for a practical plan. Our history shows a democracy's deep reluctance to bear arms in times of peace—to the point where we have learned that weakness, too, can be a danger. After World War II, for example, we demobilized until we had no division and no air group ready for combat. Our defense budget was one-fourth of its present level. The rebuilding of our strength was a necessity undertaken reluctantly, forced upon us by those who would not join in building a peaceful world.

Disarmament would be simple in a world in which the major political issues have been resolved. Since we cannot expect an early end to rivalry and discord, and since an arms race adds to tension, our present task is the far more difficult one of finding measures which will safely permit reductions in arms while a world of law and order is coming into being. This is why effective inspection and control are required, why progressive steps appear to be a prudent procedure, why the constitutional structure for settling disputes must be strengthened, and why effective international police forces are needed to support the processes of law. The purpose is a peaceful world—and in a peaceful world large military establishments would have no place; the building of that world puts us on the road to disarmament.

We should not suppose that the problem of disarmament is limited to the great powers or to the Northern Hemisphere. The burden of arms

can fall upon all nations, large and small. While the so-called great powers are exploring the possibilities of major arms reductions, other nations may find that they, too, can review their situations and make a useful contribution. President Kennedy has endorsed the suggestion made in Latin America, for example, that "the time has come to take the first steps toward sensible limitations of arms."

There may be other nations, at some distance from the great centers of military power, who may find it to their advantage to undertake agreements among themselves to limit their arms to internal security purposes. Such agreements would help to prevent a diversion of resources sorely needed for economic and social development and would, in addition, make it less likely that they would be drawn into the larger arms race which we are trying to end.

In signing the United Nations Charter we committed ourselves to disarmament as a solemn purpose; it has now become an imperative goal. The path toward disarmament is tortuous and full of pitfalls. There are risks along that path, but there are more frightful risks if we do not try once more, with the combination of deep purpose and clear thought we shall require.

Among the pervasive questions which affect our foreign relations are some which concern us primarily here at home. President Kennedy has moved promptly to invigorate the executive branch to see that action is taken when it is required. We can no longer afford merely to knock the tail feathers out of our problems as they pass us by. Delay or inaction should be intentional, not caused by neglect or entrenched bureaucratic habit. As the pace of events accelerates, cumbersome machinery must be simplified. Responsibilities are being assigned to known individuals, in specified departments, rather than to faceless committees. Ideas are being given a chance to grow into policy, not strangled at birth by procedural entanglements. Coordination becomes a responsibility of the action agency, not a device to spread hidden vetoes around the city of Washington.

A similarly realistic view is being taken of the use of available resources for the tasks at hand. With regard to foreign aid, for example, we are moving to simplify organization and to assign greater responsibilities to those in charge of country programs abroad. We shall need a basis for

³ For a statement by the President, see *ibid.*, Apr. 8, 1961, p. 478.

long-range planning and commitment in foreign aid, both to enable us to do first things first and to permit us to work out with other countries the effort which they must undertake if our assistance is to have practical results. The President is asking our own citizens for the resources we need to contribute at critical points to economic and

social development abroad, but others must give us something to support. Development cannot be exported from one country to another; foreign aid can only be the critical increment; development comes out of the national effort of a people stimulated by the promise of a new era, led by governments dedicated to the task.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference at Berkeley, March 20¹

Secretary Rusk: First, I would like to say that it is good to be in the Bay area again. I came because the university was good enough to ask me to come out for the Charter Day exercises.² I have had many contacts with this area in the past. I taught at Mills College for 6 years. My wife is a Mills student. I attended Boalt Hall here on a part-time basis for the better part of 4 years—my degree was interrupted by World War II. I have a son here at the university now. So this is a very pleasant and quick visit to the West Coast; I am expected back in my office in Washington tomorrow morning.

I have no announcements to make. As you can understand, there will be many questions on your minds that I won't be able to go into in detail. Some of these questions are complicated, dealing with negotiations and discussions with other governments, and will not be useful, and premature—or anyway it would interfere with the handling of some of these matters officially.

Now I would like to deal in response to some of your questions. I hope you won't be too disappointed if you don't get completed answers to all of them. So who would like to lead off?

Q. Mr. Secretary, I might give you an entree in the light of what you said. Would you care to comment on the new note of caution and perhaps quiet diplomacy which seems to characterize the new administration?

¹ Held at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif. (press release 148 dated March 21).

² For an address by Secretary Rusk, see p. 515.

A. We are trying to deal with a great many questions and to talk over with other governments, with other states, and this involves a great deal of old-fashioned diplomacy. We do believe that it is important to have effective channels of communications that are open at all times, that it should not be a major event for an ambassador to call at the Foreign Office either in Washington or any of the other principal capitals. So we hope to make considerable use of diplomacy for the purposes for which it was intended.

On the other hand, there will be times when we shall have to use flexible procedures. My own personal views as a private citizen about conference diplomacy became rather well known last year, but it is the official responsibility to keep their eyes on the main purposes and to adopt the techniques and the procedures which will best get on with the achieving of the results in mind.

I am going out to Bangkok, for example, next week—as a matter of fact at the end of this week—for a meeting of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] Council. We don't want to become dogmatic about procedure, but we do want to make the maximum use of our diplomatic channels.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence that the Red Chinese are participating directly in relation with the arms buildup in Laos?

A. We have had little info on this point. As you will recall the two stories written by two correspondents during their recent visit, they themselves did not report Chinese being present. So

far as we can tell, the principal assistance there has come from the Russian supply and perhaps some help from across the border in northern Viet-Nam.

Q. Sir, what significance would you attach to the buildup by the Russians?

A. I would not want to speculate on that one.

Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

Q. Sir, President Kennedy said about the nuclear test ban negotiations that one real serious effort, one more real serious effort, should be made and then, if no agreement could be reached, that we resume testing. In the light of that statement is there any target time, any deadline, on how long the Geneva conference now might continue?

A. I am not sure that you are accurate in quoting the President on that particular point. Are you referring to some discussion during the campaign?

Q. The campaign, yes, I believe.

A. The main business at hand now in these negotiations—and they begin in Geneva tomorrow—is to try to get a realistic treaty which would impose a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons with adequate inspection controls. We are going into these negotiations with great seriousness of purpose. It is obvious, when you think of the purposes of negotiations, that such a treaty would not be in itself a major step in disarmament but would be a very useful and significant first step, and we would like to see a reasonable treaty come out of it. We think there is no reason why a mutually acceptable treaty cannot be negotiated there if all parties come to the table with a real interest in getting one. If these negotiations are not successful, then the question of what we do about nuclear testing will have to be taken up and considered in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. I think it would not be helpful to try to anticipate the decisions that will have to be taken then because the present purpose is to try to get this treaty negotiated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been some reports that the Kennedy administration is taking a soft approach in a diplomatic outlook on a world situation today, rather than the hard approach of the Republicans. What do you have to say to that?

A. I don't think this is a question of hardness or softness. I think the problem, of course, is whether it is possible to find any basis for constructive agreements on any of these small or the large problems in front of us. As you have all observed, there is now at the present time a certain condition of civility in the exchange between the two Governments, but we should not suppose that this means that the great issues have been resolved or that the major problems have disappeared.

The present administration is fully alive to American interests and to the interests of the free world and expects to support them with diligence and firmness.

Q. Is there anything to this report of a soft approach to the Communists?

A. Well, what would a soft approach mean? I would think not. We are negotiating a number of questions, discussing some of them with the United Nations, one of them tomorrow in Geneva. I discussed some the other day with Mr. Gromyko.³ I would not think softness and hardness relevant adjectives for the situation.

We are deeply committed to the survival and the future of freedom. We also are prepared to maintain communications with other governments to see if we can work out some of these problems.

The Disarmament Problem

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the fact that we have not accomplished disarmament in the world is due to the fact that the question is almost an insoluble one or that negotiations have been conducted in perhaps the wrong way?

A. Well, disarmament is in any event an extremely complicated question, because it affects our relationships which are heavily involved with great political issues. It will not be a simple and easy problem to resolve. I am commenting on that in my remarks this afternoon.

But we do believe that the great public interest in disarmament all over the world is rooted in a proper realization that an arms race is not only burdensome but dangerous and that govern-

³ For text of an agreed statement issued on Mar. 18 after a meeting between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 479.

ments are to do their best to work out some reasonable solutions in this field.

We are making our first effort in the nuclear test bans. We will be working very hard in the months immediately ahead on the broader questions of disarmament.

Obviously there has not been much progress in the past many years in this field. If we and other governments can take a fresh look at it, perhaps we can come up with some approaches that would allow us to take some steps along the way, but I think it would be imprudent to try to predict what steps can be taken at this stage. We will be working on that very hard the next several weeks and months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, concerning disarmament and the nuclear discussions that will be held in Geneva, do you feel that the current administration has changed its position in any way from the previous administration, whether this be a minor change or a major change?

A. Well, I think the objectives in these nuclear test bans are the same. I think the general approach is along these same lines, because issues of inspection and control are there—the same issues.

I don't think it would be advisable for me today, before negotiations start, to indicate in any detail what our negotiator will be proposing at the table nor characterize it in any way. We think we have a workable and realistic and satisfactory proposal to make looking toward a treaty. We hope very much that the others at the table will find them reasonable and acceptable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you go into any greater detail on your meeting with Gromyko the other day as to what took place?

A. No, sir.

Q. Mr. Secretary; just how much hope do you have for these negotiations in Geneva?

A. If you enter a negotiation on an important matter of that sort, with a serious purpose, I think the seriousness of your own purpose will lead you to hope that an agreement can be reached. But if you go beyond that and speculate on whether you are optimistic about a conclusion, now that turns on the attitude of the others at the table, and we are in no position yet to know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the New York Times says

this morning that both the United States and British delegations are going into this meeting tomorrow with the realization there is not much hope for general disarmament. Would you comment on that?

A. I don't know what the basis of that story was. We should find out in the next several days or weeks whether the story is accurate or not.

U.S. Vote on Angola Question

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think last week's vote in the United Nations on the Angola question marks a change in the United States' policy? **

A. I think there has been some greater interest on the part of the new administration in the great forces which are producing changes in many parts of the world. I am commenting on that in my remarks later today.

We do believe that those who are responsible for the administration of overseas territories need to think hard about the development of those peoples and those territories. The great instinctive, traditional reaction of the American people on such questions has been well demonstrated over the years.

We hope very much these questions can be worked out in a peaceful way without the violence we have seen recently in Angola.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your speech this afternoon suggests the United States will support permanent United Nations armed forces. Would you comment on that?

A. This is a question which has come up in various forms over the years, beginning with the efforts we made at the time or shortly after the signing of the charter. You will recall that chapter VII of the charter anticipated the provision of armed forces at the call of the Security Council, under the military advice and direction of the Military Staff Committee, on which the principal or, rather, permanent members of the Security Council will be represented. Since those negotiations more than 10 years ago failed to produce any result, there have been other suggestions as to how a United Nations Force might come into being.

I think this is something we must turn our attention back to to see if we can't devise some way

* For background, see *ibid.*, p. 497.

to give to the United Nations a readily available force which can be used for keeping the peace and a number of situations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is our military aid program to Laos in any way linked or conditioned by our membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization?

A. No. I think there is no direct organic relation there. We have been interested in the stability and the peace of all of these countries in southeast Asia.

Military and economic assistance in Laos were undertaken within the framework of the Geneva accords⁵ and in full cooperation with the suggestion of the Laotian Government. That has not been linked to the activities of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Q. Would you say or suggest whether there has been anything in our Government as to whether we might suggest to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization a defense command comparable to NATO?

A. Those are questions I would not want to comment on, particularly since I will be leaving on this trip at the end of the week.

Old-Fashioned Diplomacy

Q. Mr. Secretary, you called for a return to what you said was old-fashioned diplomacy. Do you mean old-fashioned diplomacy the way our country used to practice, or do you mean old-fashioned diplomacy the way some of the old countries used to practice?

A. Well, I wouldn't want to insist upon that difference. Diplomacy is a means of discussion between governments, and in most cases discussions between governments is the best way to find out whether there is any basis for agreement, how irritations might be reduced, how difficulties might be resolved, how common purposes might be discovered, how cooperation can be arranged.

Diplomacy is a very large business. As I earlier called attention to the fact, the outgoing daily traffic from the Department of State every day is larger than the daily output of the Associated Press and United Press International in Washington, D.C. In other words, this is a very intensive

process of communication among governments. So it is the channel of communication that is important.

Now, I might say that there is another aspect of old-fashioned diplomacy that is worth considering. Comments have been made about throwing some stones upon the formalities of diplomacy, but these formalities have a purpose. The purpose is to try to eliminate the accidents of personality, the irrelevancies that might crop up in informal discussion, so that the relations between states can be handled as just that—interstate relations. Most of these old-fashioned rules of formal protocol are designed to communicate with each other under conditions of calmness and sobriety and civility, so that the main business can be the principal subject of conversation and irrelevancies kept out of it.

It should not make any difference, for example, whether the particular negotiator happens to get up in the morning with a headache; if he is trained in the discourse of diplomacy, this won't come through, whereas if he were speaking from the way in which he happened to feel that day, he might express irritations or resentments that have nothing to do with the main business at hand.

Strengthening the United Nations

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any hope in the immediate future for an adoption—as you referred to here in your speech—of a variety of national policies and an adoption of a consistent policy?

A. In the U.N.?

Q. In the Congo and in the U.N.?

A. I think this is one of the problems that will have to be worked on very hard in the course of the U.N. debate.

The very increase in membership to 99 underlines the importance of intensive regular consultation among the delegations at the United Nations. We have tried to strengthen our delegation at the United Nations to permit this kind of consultation. If the resolutions of the United Nations turn out to be simply a least common denominator, or if they turn out to be resolutions which encompass many divergent points of view, so that the resolutions themselves are hard to interpret, hard to understand, then the United Nations policy becomes ineffective and unclear. What we hope is by the process of discussion, debate, consultation,

⁵ For text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 775.

and by a pooling of national interest in terms of an effective United Nations policy interest, that we can improve and strengthen the work of the United Nations.

Q. But this is over a period of considerable time?

A. This will take time and a great deal of discussion among governments.

Q. Would you say in months, perhaps years?

A. This will be a gradual process in which everyone will be working, we hope, straight along. It will become easy on certain questions; it will be far more difficult on others. But we hope that some consensus can be produced through these discussions up there that will make sense from the point of view of the total world community. One of the efforts that we made shortly after January 20th was to renew the discussion on the Congo among governments by going to them and talking about the problems there, and the role of the United Nations, in the hope that a clearer United Nations policy could be evolved. We think that some improvement resulted from the United Nations' policy about the Congo but that depends upon the developments of consensus in the United Nations itself, because in the absence of that consensus the United Nations cannot possibly be effective.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will we continue to oppose the admission of Red China to the United Nations?

A. We have already commented on that question earlier. The question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations is very complicated from a parliamentary point of view. We recognize and support the membership of the Government of the Republic of China and will continue to do so. The authorities in Peiping have indicated that they are not interested in relationships unless Formosa is abandoned. It may be that the question comes up as to whether they have any interest in membership in the United Nations under these circumstances. We committed ourselves by treaty and otherwise to the Government of the Republic of China, but I would not want to get into parliamentary problems and the voting situation and the negotiations that will have to take place in the General Assembly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you were to compile a priority list of the major problems facing the

United States in terms of the new administration, how would you list those problems?

A. I really would not want to do that because the United States is in a situation where we have interests in all parts of the world; there are problems for us and for others in all parts of the world. Any list of priorities that we might put together would not reflect priorities that anyone else might give the same list of problems. There are many of them; in trying to give you such a list off the cuff I am sure that I would perhaps omit many of these problems that are of vital importance to somebody else.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President outlined the 10-point program to Latin America.⁵ What has been the reaction of the Latin American countries?

A. The reaction has been one of lively interest and generally warm support throughout the hemisphere. There is a lot of work ahead of us to carry that program forward with the full consultation with our Latin American friends. We will be going into a meeting of the Inter-American Council. The President indicated how their development plans and our assistance might be best related to make a major contribution to the development of the hemisphere, but the reaction was favorable and encouraging.

Peace Corps

*Q. Does the President have any ideas, or has he outlined any, to the extent he will use the Peace Corps?*⁶

A. I am sure that the Peace Corps will be involved in development programs in Latin America as in other parts of the world. It has been very interesting to see the response from around the country to the Peace Corps proposal. One of our problems in foreign aid over the years has been that we must recruit people for foreign aid on the basis of voluntary recruitment. We can't assign Americans to take on these jobs, a lot of them in difficult and at times even dangerous situations. The problem of finding the professional and technical competence on the one side and the willingness to serve on the other has been a formidable one over the years. The idea of a Peace

⁵ BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 20, 1961, p. 400.

Corps has brought forward a great many volunteers, among them professionally trained people who are going to be extremely helpful in our aid programs abroad, and there will be a period of experimentation in method. There will be discussions with a number of other governments as to how such a Peace Corps might best contribute under those situations. I think we will have a great variety of activities undertaken by those who are accepted in the Peace Corps—some of them as individuals, some of them as groups, some of them through Government, some of them through private organizations. There is going to be a great deal of experimentation. It is a very exciting thing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since taking over as Secretary of State, have you run into any problems that were unanticipated?

A. You always get some unearned dividends on a job of this sort. We did not predict the *Santa Maria* case, for example. Yes, you get a regular flow of surprises of that sort, but that is part of the business.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have there been any developments in recent weeks to indicate that there is a lessening of the tension between Cuba and the United States?

A. I think the present situation has come about as you put it, is "No." We have seen no indication of any change in that situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, here about 4 or 5 years ago, I seem to recall, when still a member of the Senate, President Kennedy was one of the few people to see any merit and have any sympathy for Algerian aspirations and independence. Do you think that has played any role in the French sitting down with the nationals for present negotiations?

A. I think the present situation has come about largely through hope, both of General de Gaulle and the leaders of the Arabs, that they could find an agreement. Undoubtedly the attitude of the United States and President Kennedy has been part of this situation in the sense that we ourselves hope that they can find agreement. This is a very significant time in that problem, and General de Gaulle has moved on his side with great courage. We believe that with seriousness on both sides, as we think there is at the present time, there is a good chance for the settlement of this problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the French attitude on the nuclear test bans will have any effect on the negotiations in Geneva?

A. The negotiations in Geneva are among the three—the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and ourselves. The question of France's attitude or relationship to any possible treaty is something that we will have to take up in due course, but we feel that the first step is to see if we can find agreement among the three. Naturally the attitude of other countries in the future will become important, because the kind of treaty we are thinking about could not be an effective treaty unless all those who might be involved with nuclear weapons would be part of the international system.

Q. Just one final question, Mr. Secretary, if you could sum up how we stand today, do you feel we are in a better position today internationally than we were, say, a year ago?

A. I think perhaps this kind of generalization would be one for the commentators to think about. Perhaps I am a little superstitious about making a remark on that kind of subject. There are a lot of problems in front of us. We have got a lot of hard work to do.

There are a great deal of efforts being put into finding solutions to some of our problems in building our relationships with other countries, but this comes out in the result, and I would not want to comment generally. I am sorry.

Letters of Credence

Republic of Congo

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Emmanuel Domongo Dadet, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on March 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 147 dated March 21.

Gabon

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon, Joseph N'Goua, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on March 22. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 151 dated March 22.

The Ethics of Mutual Involvement

Remarks by Harlan Cleveland¹

We are used to the practice, if not yet to the theory, of mutual international involvement. We know that Americans are deeply involved in the affairs of dozens of nations through technical assistance programs, military arrangements, business enterprises, missionary work, and voluntary agencies. We know that our cultural exports are matched by cultural imports—most North American party goers think nothing of dancing for at least half the evening to the samba, the cha-cha, and other rhythms which give some of us a kind of culture shock right on our own hometown dance floors.

We know that our vigorous efforts to export merchandise are matched by foreign competition in our own market, competition which is sometimes so painful that it erupts in our politics as arguments about pottery, optical goods, garlic, small cars, watch movements, bicycles, or something else.

We know that our interest in other countries' internal problems like land reform or budget administration is matched by the concern of foreign politicians with what we consider our "internal affairs"; leaders in every continent now feel at liberty to think out loud, within earshot of the international press, about desegregation in southern United States schools. When it comes to people crossing borders, the exodus of Americans has been matched by a flood of Europeans, Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans into American schools, colleges, universities, and industrial establishments.

At the level of information the \$100 million a year which the U.S. Information Agency has been spending abroad is paralleled by vigorous efforts, financed from overseas, to participate in the processes by which we Americans make up our minds, especially on foreign policy issues. They range from the careful and effective work of organizations like the British Information Service to the well-publicized histrionics of Mr. Khrushchev on a balcony at 68th Street and Park Avenue in New York City.

¹ Made before the American Society for Public Administration at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 15 (press release 137). Mr. Cleveland is Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

We can understand from our own experience that some forms of intervention are beyond the pale. When the president of a radio network sells his supposedly objective news coverage for cash to the leaders of a foreign country, most people would say there was something unethical about the arrangement, just as most people would condemn the suborning of a supposedly independent witness in a court proceeding. Americans generally were persuaded that it was hardly appropriate for a foreign power to maintain on our soil a political party whose allegiance was abroad; and so the Communist Party, U.S.A., had to go underground. If a foreign country were to establish here a lobby for the unilateral abolition of nuclear weapons, or an alien group were to set up a technical assistance project to help the American organizations that are fighting for desegregation of public education in the South, even Americans who agreed with the objective would feel that the methods somehow went too far.

When the shoe is on the other foot and Americans are working in other people's backyards, we also feel that an ethical line has to be drawn. It is all right to help set up an agricultural extension service, but the visiting American expert would probably be thrown out of the country if he started making campaign speeches for or against political candidates in a local election.

Some forms of intervention, then, are beyond the pale. But who decides the boundaries of the pale, and on what criteria? We need an ethics of mutual involvement. And I suggest that it will be found, in fits and starts, by trial and error, in the growing body of practice by international organizations.

For the trouble is, the traditional codes of ethics and morality do not apply very well to the new kinds of problems we now confront. The traditional forms of intervention across cultural or national boundaries have been ethically contained not so much by consideration for the intervenee as by respect for the imported ethics of the intervener. The fact that the American pioneers put the defeated American Indians on reservations rather than in graves was not the result of the pioneer's perception of an American Indian morality; rather it reflected a European Christian concept of restraint in the presence of human life. Until quite recently, says John Plamenatz of Oxford University, "the Europeans, in their behavior

toward other people, have been restrained almost entirely by their own principles (whether shared with others or peculiar to themselves) and very little by respect for what was foreign to them." The traditional ethics of mutual involvement has been inner-directed, not other-directed.

Nowadays the pendulum is swinging, if anything, too far the other way. In revulsion against the notion that the outsider should make up his own ethical restraints as he goes along, the idea has become popular that the outsider should be bound not by the criteria he finds in his own culture and tradition but by the ethics of the culture which he is serving as technician or administrator. The intervener can presumably tell whether he is overstepping those mysterious bounds by making sure that whatever he does is done at the request of the intervenee. Just as, in law, rape is not rape if there is consent, so interference is not interference if its objects accept it.

But this criterion, too, presents some difficulties of administration. Who, for example, are "they"? The government? The people? Which people? And even if this question is resolved by assuming that every government effectively represents all of the people over whom it has jurisdiction, a fundamental problem remains. The fact is that most of the less developed areas do not find in their own traditions and cultures all the elements of a code of ethics for handling the participation in their affairs of willing and ambitious advisers from the outside. The very reason for wanting advisers is to achieve more "development" or "modernization." But development is not just a matter of techniques and equipment; it requires also a revised set of attitudes and institutions.

Thus the building of institutions in the less developed areas is neither a matter of digging a hole and transplanting Western (whether Russian, European, or American) institutions, nor is it a matter of fashioning institutions wholly from local cultural raw materials. It involves a creative synthesis of the two, the development of new institutions that reflect both the cultural and technological necessities of the time and place, modifying the technology to fit the prevailing attitude but also modifying the local culture to make room for the technology.

It is in these complex circumstances that the

international organizations of the U.N. system are coming into their own. For a major power to put twenty or twenty-five thousand troops into the Congo, in the name of Congolese independence and self-determination, would be almost inconceivable in the world as it stands today. But the Security Council last month greatly strengthened the mandate of the United Nations to suppress civil strife by force if necessary.² In some very crucial situations, from Suez to the Indus Valley, we have found that the World Bank can serve as catalyst and financier for international projects that could not be put together by a single nation no matter how much good will it brought to the task. In a hundred important fields, from weather prediction to labor standards to food production to the exploration of an Antarctica, we find the nations coming together because they find they can do more for their own interests that way than by staying apart.

United States Sends Greetings to All-African Peoples' Conference

Following is the text of a message from Assistant Secretary Williams delivered on March 25 to the Secretariat of the All-African Peoples' Conference, meeting at Cairo.

Press release 164 dated March 25

MARCH 23, 1961

On the occasion of the opening of the Third All-African Peoples' Conference, I send cordial greetings and good wishes. It is my hope that realization of all the ideals of peace, freedom and social improvement, for which men of good will strive everywhere, may be advanced by your conference. The American people will observe the proceedings and results of your conference with great interest because they are concerned with the welfare of the peoples of Africa.

G. MENNEN WILLIAMS
*Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs*

² For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359.

Progress and Expectations in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

It is a pleasure to come before you today to make a brief report on a trip through 16 of the nations of Africa.² My mission on this trip was twofold. First it was my pleasure and privilege to bring personal greetings to African leaders from President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk and to convey to them and to their peoples new assurances of the strong and positive friendship of the United States. Second, and quite simply, I went to learn.

We flew down over the great desert and stopped first beside the Nile at Khartoum in the Sudan. Next day we were at 8,000 feet in Addis Ababa, capital of the oldest independent country in Africa. Two days later we were sweltering beside the Indian Ocean in the Somali Republic, one of the newest nations in the continent. And so it went. British East Africa, including storied Zanzibar, the two Congos, Cameroun, Nigeria, Togo, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Ghana, and my favorite new frontier, the capital city of Ouagadougou in Upper Volta. Our new embassy there is safely in the hands of a pair of ex-Marines and an experienced Foreign Service couple, and the lady in question is a wandering constituent from Marinesco, in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.

During this long trip I met one of the last emperors in the world. I talked with presidents and prime ministers, colonial administrators, tribal chieftains, labor leaders, businessmen, students,

and farmers, and fishermen. I have visited mission stations, factories, schools, hospitals, in jungle villages and in sprawling cities where skyscrapers push up beside thatched huts.

To three of my traveling companions I owe a real debt of gratitude. I refer to Warren Unna of the *Washington Post*, Judd Arnett of the *Detroit Free Press*, and Alan Morrison of Johnson Publications. They have set a high standard in getting a trip like this, and the image of Africa, on the record.

In fact I did not lack for expert assistance in this journey. Traveling with me were several Foreign Service and USIA officers who know Africa well and who, in west Africa, stood ready to rescue me when my command of the French language was being put to the test. Perhaps the best qualified, most vigorous, and eminently successful expert of them all was one who bore the simple but all important title "Mrs."—my wife Nancy. Like many American women she is much experienced in the world of schools, hospitals, nursing, and the basis of all civilization—children and mothers. Her keen perception gave us all insights we might have missed, and her intense and friendly interest delighted the Africans even when she was lecturing them for having so few girls in the schools.

Then, too, I had the help of the men and women of our embassies, consulates, ICA [International Cooperation Administration], and USIS [U.S. Information Service], and permit me here to throw another spadeful of earth on the dead image of our Foreign Service people as striped-pants, high-style bureaucrats ping-ponging from one cocktail party to another. These are wash-and-wear people, working with their sleeves rolled

¹ Address made before the National Press Club at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 24 (press release 156).

² For an announcement of Mr. Williams' trip, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 295; for an address made before delegates to the third session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa at Addis Ababa on Feb. 17, see *ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1961, p. 373.

up and working hard. And we learned much from the dedicated American missionaries, businessmen, and educators who also represent America in Africa.

We were met everywhere with the greatest friendliness and warm hospitality, from governments and from people on the street and in the countryside. The peoples of Africa unquestionably have a great reservoir of good will toward America. Once in the Congo an overly eager U.N. sergeant broke up what he apparently thought was a riot but was only an impromptu crowd gathering to say hello and shake hands with us. The Africans place much trust in America, even to the extent of being quite candid about our shortcomings here at home and in our responses to their needs and hopes.

Common African Aspirations

We found great contrasts in Africa and observed many stages of political, economic, and social development. Yet there are certain aspirations held in common in the countries we visited. Let me place them under nine headings:

1. The Africans want freedom from colonialism, from any form of outside domination.
2. The Africans want and will insist on racial equality in the world.
3. The Africans do not want to align themselves in a great-power struggle. They are for the most part neutral in international politics, or perhaps more accurately they are not ready to commit their new independence elsewhere.
4. The Africans naturally want government institutions which fit the values of their own societies. This may sometimes mean a greater reliance on some aspects of centralized authority than in the advanced democracies of the Western World, although democratic forces will make themselves felt.
5. A good many African leaders feel they must plan their economies for rapid development and seem to favor a mixture of private and government-owned enterprise. In part this is because of a lack of local capital. Some call this a socialist approach, but almost without exception it is far from rigid or doctrinaire. Actually I thought I was back in American State government when I visited western and eastern Nigeria and saw the regional governments encouraging private industry and investment. We saw this elsewhere too.

6. African leaders want economic development, but many of them have yet to assess not only the opportunities but the limitations which confront them in the economic field. They are bound to make some mistakes before they hit the stride which their nations can maintain in a competitive world.

7. There is a growing awareness of the need to raise standards of health and vitality in Africa. This means not only more medicines and doctors and hospitals; it means a more adequate diet and a lot more protein intake.

8. Agriculture is the main African occupation, and a drive is beginning to raise yields and income from farming. The importance of doing so is indicated by the extremely low per capita income figures.

9. Finally, and most commanding, is the need, the burning desire, for education. The literacy rate in Africa is something less than 10 percent. I repeat, 10 percent. The educational need is thus felt not just at the top, in terms of college graduates, but in the primary and secondary school levels. We learned that in many local communities the people were raising school buildings with voluntary labor, as frontier communities did in this country.

If we accept these nine points, we can begin to look realistically at the problems of Africa. In my own reckoning they lead to this first conclusion:

A Race Between Expectations and Performance

Africans are generally agreed on their goals and aspirations and feel they must be achieved in the relatively near future. As a result in tropical African countries there is a race between the rising expectations of the people and what their governments can deliver. This race is the basic issue in Africa today, an issue which in fact is critical for the world and for us here today.

The dangerous side of this race is not hard to see. Africa's new leaders are faced with a situation which invites demagoguery and reckless opportunism. These forces, wholly apart from communism, will seek to stimulate and exploit any failure or discontent. This greatly increases the challenge to responsible leadership, the challenge to build for genuine progress. It was my privilege to get to know many of these leaders, and I have a great respect for their general level

of competence and devotion. I wish each of you could have been with me to feel the intensity with which one outstanding leader said to me: "Mr. Williams, we have won our freedom; we have a democratic society—now we need help." This leader knows he must produce.

This can be better understood if we look briefly at the historical setting. Tropical Africa was long isolated from the rest of the world. Its own special history is essentially one of minor kingdoms and many tribes, of local wars and scattered migrations. Unlike the peoples of other continents the Africans have not been molded through force of arms and cultural dominion into one or a few broad cultures. The tribe is still the underlying base of society, and the degree of fragmentation is suggested by the fact that 800 to 1,000 languages are spoken in the continent. The colonial imprint on Africa has been important but incomplete.

Africa's journey in the greater world is thus of very recent origin. But it has been gathering momentum at a terrific pace. There were four independent nations in all Africa in 1945. In 1959 there were 10. Today there are 27. This is an absolutely unprecedented transfer of power, and it has created an atmosphere of great expectations, of great new beginnings. The aspirations of the African peoples have been brought to the fore by leaders determined to realize rapid advances in human dignity, physical well-being, and national progress.

Really we should try to put ourselves for a moment in the position of one of the leaders of the new Africa—let us say, of Dr. Azikiwe in Nigeria, of Felix Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast, of Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. They have led their peoples to independence or in the case of Nyerere to the threshold of independence. But the African peoples are only now beginning to think in national terms. We hear much about "African nationalism," but more correctly what is meant is the immemorial urge—this time in Africa—for freedom. African leaders and their supporters have won freedom *from* something—from colonial rule. Now they must give content to the momentum that has carried them to independence and get their peoples to use freedom *for* something—for the building of modern nations and the realization of economic and social progress.

For this task they have, in modern terms, all too little to work with.

That is why I say that the new governments are in a race with time and the expectations of the African peoples—expectations which are fed by today's easier communication and wider contact with the world outside. Newly won independence means newly assumed obligations for Africa's leaders, and they need outside support and assistance. Without exception they have turned to the West first and for most of the assistance they must have. Only where that help has not been forthcoming, or where it has been too little or too late, have they placed their primary reliance elsewhere. It is not an easy thing, I can tell you, to hear out young and progressive African leaders as they earnestly discuss minor amounts of American aid in terms of the political life and death of their countries.

U.S. Program of Assistance

In the field of economic aid and investment the main facts today are these: British and French assistance, which except in Guinea has not dried up when a country has become independent, is at an annual level of over \$700 million, according to a leading university report. These contributions are a vital base for most African economies, and let me say here that I believe both France and Britain have done commendable jobs in tropical Africa. U.S. aid programs are supplemental, and in this fiscal year will total about \$250 million. This covers grants, loans, and technical assistance but not surplus agricultural commodities. Almost half of this total is going to three north African countries.

What can be said of these figures? Are they large in relation to the need, or in relation to development aid given elsewhere, or are they small? The fact is they are small on both counts. To take an example from aid given elsewhere, we gave more to Austria alone in the first year of the Marshall plan than the figure I have just given you for all of Africa this year. To measure Africa's *needs* is not a simple matter, but it may help to cite two figures. The first is per capita national income, which for Africa as a whole is \$89 a year. This compares to \$171 for the Near East, \$253 for Latin America, \$790 for Western Europe, and over \$2,500 for the United States. The second figure represents the total value of all

the goods and services produced by Africa, in comparison with the United States. The figure is 3 percent—Africa produces 3 percent of what we do—and yet that continent is three times the size of the United States and supports over 200 million people.

If we cannot equate such figures with needs in any absolute sense, we can certainly use them to gage where Africa stands in the world's lineup. Africa cannot be neatly lumped in with our usual generalizations for the world. Africa's problems are new and different, and we must mark the differences and understand how they affect the total world balance.

It would be rash of me to venture very deeply into what the United States role toward Africa should be. Yet it is impossible to miss the point that Africa's leaders expect from the United States a greater response to their needs at this time of the birth of nations throughout a continent. And for me it is impossible to imagine that we will miss seeing the consequences of failing them. I am encouraged in this by the first reactions to President Kennedy's appeal of 2 days ago³ for a new approach designed to fulfill our moral, political, and economic obligations in support of freedom.

Such talk may in your minds conjure up thoughts of vast new sums of money for aid programs. It is true, of course, that it will cost money to enable African leaders to meet the dangerous challenges of ignorance, poverty, and disease. But the need is not for a sudden and unlimited increase in funds. We are not alone in extending aid. And the capacity to absorb and put economic assistance to work productively is limited in Africa at this time. What we can and should do is well within reasonable expectations when judged by the criteria of our wealth and leadership in the world, by the record of our performance in the past, and by the stake we have in human dignity everywhere.

There is, however, an urgency, a timeliness, that we must not miss in anything we do or hope for in Africa. We must act more quickly; we must throw in our support now, today. We must help Africa's leaders to build schools and get teachers into them—some from our own shores, many more from Africa itself. We must export our know-how to the farmers of Africa, and we must be

ready to help get more food from our surpluses into African stomachs. We must support community development. We must help small industries, like that of a trader I saw in Kenya who started his small store with an ICA loan. In some cases we should take on larger schemes for the development of power and new manufactures. In doing so we shall be enhancing the probability that American private investment can play a growing part in Africa's future development.

The sum of these contributions will not transform Africa overnight. And in any case that transformation is ultimately in the hands of the peoples of Africa and of their new leaders.

Essentially and in conclusion, these are the impressions I have come back with. You may remark that I have not talked about the Communists or the Congo or the cold war. I will try to answer questions, if you wish to ask them, about these and other points I have not touched on. Just let me say, however, that we had better be coldly realistic about Communist-bloc influence in Africa. The new nations there do not emerge into a one-sided world. They see it whole, and they are not going to slam the door on another great power which commands large political and economic resources. The Sino-Soviet presence will inevitably increase in Africa, and its emissaries will be well armed with promissory notes—some open, some offered covertly to ambitious and unscrupulous power seekers. The push of a new imperialism is thus certain to seek headway in Africa. This is one more reason, and a weighty one, for us to get busy learning all we can about Africa, understanding the aspirations of its peoples and supporting its new leaders in the great enterprise of construction that lies before them.

Finally let me say Africa is not only a challenge but an opportunity; we saw it in the bright eager faces of hundreds of young school children. And I remember especially visiting a mission station 50 miles from Léopoldville in the Congo. The missionaries were back only 3 days since evacuation. They said they had left long after the other whites because the indigenous Africans had protected them and finally warned them they had better go—they left by helicopter. All the while the missionaries were gone the Africans ran the mission church, the school, and the hospital—as we could see. Africans when given the opportunity can and do hold high the finest values of hu-

³ See p. 507.

man dignity. This, then, is the real challenge of Africa, the real opportunity—to fulfill our American philosophy by helping our fellow human beings realize for themselves the full significance and rich blessings of individual dignity as well as national freedom.

Educators From Republic of the Congo Arrive in U.S. for Training

Press release 158 dated March 24

Nineteen Congolese educators arrived on March 24 to start an 18-month educational training course in the United States under sponsorship of the International Cooperation Administration. This is the second group of Congolese to be brought to the United States for this type of training under the ICA-financed university scholarship program and represents part of the 300 scholarships presented as an Independence Day gift by the U.S. Government to the Congo.

The group includes Catherine Djoli, who is the 101st participant and the first woman to be brought to the United States from the Congo. Miss Djoli is principal of one of Léopoldville's largest primary schools. The other members of the group are engaged in primary school work also.

The young Congolese will enroll at Georgetown University on March 28 for a 6-month course in English-language training. They will study and receive instructions from other colleges in the United States concerning the educational teaching, methodology, supervision, and administration of schools before returning to Léopoldville.

Under the present participant training program, nationals from host countries increase their knowledge and skill through academic studies, inservice training programs, observation trips, seminars, workshops, and practice teaching. Participants undertaking academic study and inservice training programs come to the United States for varying periods of time. The participant may attend classes at a college or university or may obtain his training by experience in plants, factories, or offices. Seminars and workshops are arranged for participants in many fields such as communications, public health, education, and agriculture.

As in other phases of technical cooperation, the participant program in a host country is es-

tablished in response to the needs and desires of the host government, and the initiative and request for training come from the host country.

U.S. To Negotiate With Liberia for Expanded Education Program

Press release 160 dated March 24

The Government of the United States will shortly enter into negotiations with the Government of Liberia for an expanded education program. The contemplated agreement will involve the transfer of ownership of certain facilities in the Port of Monrovia which were constructed on the basis of a World War II agreement between the two countries.

The negotiations involve the settlement of a lend-lease debt of approximately \$19 million incurred to develop Liberia's port facilities. It is the hope of the U.S. Government that amounts corresponding to annual lend-lease payments will be used for the education of Liberians.

The United States will view negotiation of this agreement as a further step in the long history of harmonious relations between the United States and Liberia.

Bolivia Receives \$3.5 Million ICA Loan

Press release 159 dated March 24

A special assistance loan of \$3.5 million was made to the Government of Bolivia on March 24 by the International Cooperation Administration. The loan represents part of a \$10 million credit to Bolivia which was previously announced in La Paz on November 28, 1960.

The purpose of the loan is to assist in rehabilitating the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) mines and concentration plants. Proceeds from the loan will be used to purchase tools and spare parts in the United States.

The loan represents the U.S. contribution to the first phase of a triangular arrangement whereby the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-American Development Bank expect to make similar amounts available to Bolivia.

The loan is repayable in U.S. dollars over a period of 10 years at 5 3/4 percent interest.

Ambassador Victor Andrade of Bolivia signed the loan agreement on behalf of his Government.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Replies to Soviets on Congo Situation

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Mr. President, the United States deeply regrets the passing of one of our colleagues [Manuel Bisbé y Alberni, Cuban representative]. He died in the line of duty.

I do not intend to speak at length but after hearing the statement by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union [Andrei A. Gromyko] I feel that a few things need to be said promptly.

After listening to the Soviet speech, which we had already heard in the Security Council, I have concluded that there are two Congo problems—one in Africa and one in New York—and that the one in New York is, if anything, the most serious.

Many of our delegations during the past 2 weeks have been endeavoring to shorten our agenda in order to reduce the area of recrimination, of reckless calumny, of cold war which has unhappily marred our debates in the past. These efforts have not succeeded, but I was frankly astonished to hear the Soviet Foreign Minister open the first debate of this resumed session with a speech which, to say the least, is in the worst and most destructive traditions of the cold war. I am afraid that we must take this as further evidence that the Soviet Union does not regard our Organization as a means of international cooperation but simply as an instrument of international discord.

U.N. Purpose in the Congo

I believe we should all remind ourselves that our purpose in this debate and the purpose of the United Nations in the Congo is to enable the Congolese people to solve their own political problems through peaceful and conciliatory means by protecting the Congo from external interference

and by helping them establish internal security. In this connection I invite your attention to paragraph 143 of the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo,² which has just been laid on our desks. This paragraph reads as follows:

The Commission feels that an appeal should be made to all States to abstain from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of the country and, in particular, to avoid assuming any attitude which might aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the Congo and thus make reconciliation more difficult.

The reason, I remind you, for this great and expensive effort in the Congo—and I wish the Soviet Union would contribute something to it besides obstruction and criticism—is not to impose a government on the Congo but to help the Congolese establish a government of their own choosing, to help them help themselves.

On February 21 the Security Council adopted an important resolution³ designed to achieve these objectives. The first steps have been taken. The United Nations Force in the Congo is being strengthened. Efforts are under way to bring about the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel, mercenaries, and political advisers. Civil war has not developed. Steps toward political conciliation have been taken.

Now, the obstacles we know confronting the Secretary-General in the Congo are unprecedented. To put more obstacles in his path by these incessant Soviet attacks not only does violence to any respect for justice but also is an ill-designed attack on the United Nations effort to aid the Congo.

We deeply regret that this rostrum has become a platform for such wild and irresponsible and absurd attacks. We have not even been spared the charge of an accomplice to murder. To use the unhappy state of affairs in the Congo as an excuse for such insensate attacks on the Secretary-

¹ Made in plenary session on Mar. 21 (U.S. delegation press release 3670).

² U.N. doc. A/4711, Corr. 1, Add. 1 and 2.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1961, p. 368.

General compounds the offense to the dignity of this body and to the very survival of the United Nations as an effective operating instrument for peace and progress.

Once more I must make it clear that my Government respects the high office of the Secretary-General and it thanks the Secretary-General for what he has done and is trying to do to give effect to the instructions of this body. We think he should be helped, not hindered, in his work for us. We consider him a dedicated, impartial, and scrupulously honest official of unimpeachable integrity and that we are fortunate to have such a man in this most difficult post at this most critical time.

A Period of Fruitful Collaboration

After listening to the Soviet speech this morning I have concluded that, of course, there is further hard work that remains to be done in the Congo. Much of it will have to be done here in New York. Then the aspiration of the local leaders and the intent of the most recent Security Council resolution must be reconciled. Retraining of local troops needs to be worked out. Institutions of internal administration and for economic and social development need to be strengthened, and cooperation between the Congo and the United Nations needs to be improved.

In short, we desperately need a period of fruitful collaboration between the United Nations and the Congo during which we all use our best efforts to make the United Nations operation succeed. I suggest we must stop pulling up the roots of this fragile plant every few days to see if it is growing. That is the best way to kill the plant, and I suspect that that may be the objective of some of these incessant attacks.

I regret exceedingly that today the Soviet Union has provoked another debate with the clear intention not to encourage conciliation in the Congo but to sow dissension and discord. This statement has confirmed our belief which we expressed to many delegations this weekend that it would not be helpful to rush into a Congo debate. The sort of statement that we have heard this morning is not helpful to the effort of the United Nations in the Congo, as the distinguished delegate from Brazil has indicated. It is not helpful to the Congo itself.

We all know that the Conciliation Commission

has just completed a report on the basis of extensive, on-the-ground examination in the Congo. We all knew that it would contain recommendations and conclusions that would merit our most careful consideration.

Whatever we do now we must avoid, it seems to me, two things. We must not act prematurely and emotionally so as to further complicate the United Nations operation in the Congo; and we must encourage, not discourage, efforts of the Congolese to produce viable and conciliatory political progress.

I wish to respond to only a very few points. The latest mandate of the United Nations in the Congo is contained in the resolution of February 21 in the Security Council. This resolution is scarcely a month old. Its implementation requires close cooperation between the Congolese and the United Nations and between many other states and the United Nations. It needs to be continued to be carried out. I need hardly point out to the Assembly that the United States strongly supported this resolution and we stand by it. The Soviet Union did not support this resolution. If any further proof were needed, it has now been provided. The Soviet Union does not want the United Nations to succeed in the Congo.

Summation of U.S. Views

In conclusion I should like to emphasize three points.

The Soviet Union demands the resignation of the Secretary-General. We will oppose this demand with all of our strength. We must not allow the United Nations to be demeaned by vicious attack on its most dedicated servant.

Secondly, the Soviet Union demands that the United Nations withdraw from the Congo within 1 month. The United States is totally opposed to this effort to replace constructive efforts of the world at large to achieve peace and reconciliation with anarchy. The United Nations must succeed in the Congo in the interests of all nations, large and small.

In the third place, the Congo and the United Nations desperately need a period of quiet and of constructive cooperation during which we can help the Congolese to help themselves. We now have been plunged into a destructive attack be-

fore the Conciliation Commission's report of its on-the-spot conclusions could even be digested.

We earnestly hope, therefore, that the Assembly will proceed soberly and intelligently only when we have the full facts in our possession. Efforts are under way in the Congo to produce conciliation and to carry out the resolution of February 21. It would be prejudicial, it seems to us, if the Assembly action were to impede this process. We pledge our efforts to prevent any such development. We must not allow the United Nations effort to be wrecked. We must not allow our debates to retard rather than to advance the peaceful internal developments which are so desperately needed in the Congo.

Approaching the Problem of African Development

Following are statements made by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, in Committee I (Political and Security).

STATEMENT OF MARCH 21

U.S. delegation press release 3671

I understand that shortly before the Assembly recessed in December it decided not to take any action at that time on the disarmament resolutions which are pending before this committee. As members of the committee are aware, consultations have been taking place on the disarmament question since the session of the General Assembly resumed. We feel, therefore, that it would be unwise to take up the disarmament question again at this point. It is possible, at least, that private discussions can make further contentious debate unnecessary. If not, they may, nevertheless, enlarge the area of common agreement.

I would propose, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that we continue our work with the next item on the agenda as already approved by the committee, with the understanding that the committee will decide after further consultations at what point we would resume consideration of disarmament.

This next item on the agenda is the one on

"Africa, a United Nations Program for Independence and Development." It seems to us that this is a constructive item intended to encourage ideas for United Nations assistance and that it would be a healthy way to start the business of this committee.

Last fall there was, I understand, a body of opinion that this item should be taken up even before disarmament. It is our belief that the time has now come when consideration of assistance to Africa would be beneficial.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 23

U.S. delegation press release 3674

Yesterday President Kennedy submitted to the United States Congress a special message on foreign aid.¹ In this message he reaffirms the conviction of the Government and of the people of the United States that

There exists, in the 1960's, a historic opportunity for a major economic assistance effort by the free industrialized nations to move more than half the people of the less-developed nations into self-sustained economic growth, while the rest move substantially closer to the day when they, too, will no longer have to depend on outside assistance.

It is in this conviction that we approach the problem of African development which is now before the committee.

Last September President Eisenhower in a speech before the General Assembly² outlined a program for the future development of Africa. In the intervening 6 months much has happened in Africa, much has happened in the United States and elsewhere in the world. However, most of the conditions that stimulated a more positive United Nations recognition of the needs of Africa remain unchanged. Tentative steps were taken last fall toward formulating a concrete program of United Nations assistance to African development. On this foundation, then, I hope that this committee in deliberation and consultation can contribute toward a really effective United Nations program for the nations of Africa, a program that will help fulfill their aspirations and meet their burgeoning needs. So it seems both desirable and appropriate to speak again on this

¹ See p. 507.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1960, p. 551.

vital subject to reaffirm our deep and sympathetic interest in the future of this huge continent by specific action.

It is not my purpose here today to advance a detailed, rigid program. It is rather for the Africans themselves to determine the content of such a program. I am certain that the African members of this committee out of their actual experience will have much to offer in sound ideas and in new thinking. This committee should listen carefully to what they have to say, and it is our hope that its discussions will lead to an African initiative.

It is also our hope that the various African nations, individually and jointly, will want to assume the responsibility for developing a long-range program for their continent so that it will be clear to all of the world that it is by, of, and for Africa. Only the Africans can develop Africa in the last analysis. The President of the United States in his message on foreign aid, to which I have just referred, made it clear that special attention should be given to those nations most willing and able to mobilize their own resources, to make necessary social and economic reforms, to engage in long-range plans and make the other efforts necessary if these are to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth. The United States would welcome, as I say, this initiative, and we desire very much to be associated with it.

This means, I confess, much to me personally as well as to my country. In recent years, as some of you know, I have had the privilege of traveling through Africa extensively. I have the honor of knowing many of the new leaders, whose friendship I prize. I have also met thousands of others in all walks of life and in all conditions of advancement. The past problems and urgent needs of these nations and peoples have been a lively preoccupation of mine. I say this so that, if I speak from the heart as well as the head today, you will forgive this mixing of sentiment with thought.

America's Experience

When considering this item on our agenda—this item which in effect poses the question of what is best for Africa's development—we who are Americans might ask ourselves what our Founding Fathers wanted for this country when it, too, was

first emerging as a new and independent nation. What were the feelings and attitudes, the ambitions, the aspirations, fears, and doubts of my countrymen almost 2 centuries ago? What did they and this part of North America want then, especially in relation to the rest of the world and the more powerful developed world around them?

Well, first of all—and above all—they wanted independence. On that cardinal point America was uncompromising. The young Republic of less than 3 million people was determined to exclude external interference in its internal affairs. It was equally determined to avoid what President Washington called "foreign entanglements." But it welcomed most eagerly investments from abroad. It also welcomed outside ideas and culture, not with the notion of becoming an imitation of Europe but to the end of creating a new free society which gave the best ideas of the free nations of the world completely free play. The young America was proud and did not like being patronized. It was full of plans and impatient to get on with them. It was full of the adventure of life and of fun and even of folly. Mistakes were made, but they were inevitable for a new people in a new continent bursting at the seams with vigor and with hope.

I mention all of this for, in remembering our own history, it is easier for us to understand and to sympathize with the new nations of Africa as they too begin their long, hard, exciting struggle to make their own way in the world.

Our African friends respect the great concepts of individual and of national freedom and the natural rights of human beings. They too stand for freedom, for independence, for self-determination. They too believe in the personal dignity of the individual. In support of these beliefs Africa is determined to keep itself free from any external domination, and it is to the interest of Africa as well as of the world that what is called the cold war be excluded from the African Continent.

These objectives are certainly compatible with America's hopes and interests. We seek no privileged position. We only seek to assure that people's destinies remain in their own hands. Nor is it our ambition to create an Africa in our own image but rather to help Africa create a new image of its own—a blend of the various strands woven from its history and its culture.

Importance of Proper Planning

The soundest relationship between nations, we believe, is partnership. President Kennedy emphasized this only a few days ago, when he outlined a new program of aid to Latin America.³ He said,

... only the most determined efforts of the American nations themselves can bring success to this effort If this effort is made, then outside assistance will give a vital impetus to progress; without it, no amount of help will advance the welfare of the people.

These thoughts can be applied to Africa with equal force. As our discussion progresses on this item, I hope the newly independent nations of that continent will be encouraged to develop a program of real scope, both in time and size. Giving foreign aid for political purposes always risks more than it yields. And hit-and-miss, stop-gap aid will never do the job either. Plans must be made then for the decade ahead to make the sixties a historic period of democratic progress in all of Africa.

The success of the postwar recovery of Europe has already proved what can be done if there is proper planning and real partnership. And this is a good time to note that one very important factor in that success was that Europeans themselves accepted responsibility not only for self-help but for mutual aid through the OEEC, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Our African friends will find this a useful example to keep in mind in developing their own program.

I think it not unfair to say that the United States has already shown in bilateral ways its interest in accelerating African economic development. And within the United Nations system we have tried to make additional contributions through such bodies as UNESCO, FAO, WHO, ILO, UNICEF, the Special Fund, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance.

A few days ago the United Nations through UNESCO advanced a new program (the most far-reaching it has ever undertaken) to advance African education. The proposed outlay is equal to nearly half of UNESCO's budget for the next 2 years. Yet surely this is an area in which we have made only a beginning. The clear relationship of education to progress in modern societies makes far greater efforts in this field imperative.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

The technical assistance program for Africa has been stepped up sharply from 1960 to 1961. The Special Fund already is assisting in the financing of some 15 surveys calling for total expenditures of \$18.5 million. These are positive, purposeful actions in the fields of greatest need. But more must be done.

Other Areas for Assistance

There are other fields of development in which Africa can find help through the United Nations and its members. Let me take a moment to suggest just a few areas where such assistance might be forthcoming. In making these suggestions I stress the importance of multilateral action with its built-in safeguards against political strings and the desirability of making the fullest possible use of the Economic Commission for Africa.

We should stand ready to assist the African states on their request to assess their own resources, to identify the obstacles which stand in the way of economic and social progress as they formulate programs individually and in consultation with each other on a regional or a subregional basis. If they so desire, we should be prepared to extend assistance in the formulation of such programs and plans. When their plans have been made and their programs developed, the African states will be in a strong position, we believe, to call on the United Nations and related agencies to extend technical and economic assistance on an expanded scale to help them carry out these plans.

In the formulation of plans for development we should also recognize the need for improvement and diversification of agriculture, for appropriate forms of industrialization in Africa, and the need to augment as rapidly as possible African professional and administrative personnel to carry out country or regional programs. These would appear to be the areas of primary importance where we should stand prepared to help.

Other possibilities include the whole field of infrastructure, that is, the ports, the housing, transport, and so on. Africa's needs are virtually limitless. Roads, in particular, are indispensable if the isolation of communities is to be broken down and healthy market economies established.

Here is where cooperation is indispensable. Roads which stop at frontiers, railroads which operate as closed circuits, rivers which are de-

veloped in separate and sometimes self-defeating projects—these are the symbols of political separatism, whereas the formulation of plans on a regional basis could have the opposite effect of bringing nations closer together.

All this, of course, is going to cost a lot of money, a lot of manpower. Some will say that we, the industrialized nations, ought to make their contribution out of enlightened selfishness, but I prefer to think our policy should be justified by enlightened selflessness. Our program of aid to social and economic development must be seen on its own merits, separated from military assistance as stipulated by the President in his message. I know of no country that ever had cause to regret such a policy.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the economic aid to Africa has overtones of urgency and of need unknown elsewhere. Nowhere in the world do people look forward with more hope or reach out more eagerly for the fruits of modern knowledge and modern technique. To assist this vast undertaking, this great awakening continent could and should be a great adventure in human cooperation, and it is one to which the American administration is wholeheartedly dedicated.

I hope, if circumstances permit, that I may have the privilege of addressing the committee again on this subject and with reference to the special needs of Africa as we see them.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

25th Session of ECE Steel Committee

The Department of State announced on March 23 (press release 154) that Maxwell D. Millard, administrative vice president—international, U.S. Steel Corp., will serve as U.S. delegate to the 25th session of the Steel Committee of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, which will convene at Geneva, March 27. He served in the same capacity at the 24th session of the Steel Committee, which was held at Geneva, June-July 1960.

Mr. Millard will be assisted by Werner P. Naumann, manager, Commercial Research Division, U.S. Steel Export Co., New York; William L. Sandston, supervisor of economic research,

ARMCO Steel Corp., Middletown, Ohio; and a member of the resident delegation at Geneva.

At this regular semiannual session the Committee will consider productivity and automation in the steel industry.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. 58 Stat. 1169. *Ratification deposited:* Paraguay, March 16, 1961.

Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature at Washington December 1, 1958.¹ *Ratification deposited:* Paraguay, March 16, 1961.

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(3), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756. *Ratification deposited:* Senegal, February 28, 1961.

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. *Acceptance deposited:* Ivory Coast, March 20, 1961.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and two supplementary protocols. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: March 16, 1961. *Ratified by the President:* March 23, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Protocol modifying article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force March 28, 1950. TIAS 2300.

Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2394.

First protocol of modifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2745.

¹ Not in force.

Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2746.

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy October 10, 1949. Entered into force for the United States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100.

Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2747.

Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16, 1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764.

Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.

First protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into force October 21, 1953. TIAS 2885.

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4250.

Third protocol and rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197.

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom: Nigeria, October 19, 1960.

BILATERAL

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement amending the annex to the agreement of June 30, 1955 (TIAS 3444), relating to the return of equipment furnished by the United States under the mutual defense assistance program. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Bonn March 9, 1961. Entered into force March 9, 1961.

India

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 4, 1960 (TIAS 4499), as amended (TIAS 4543 and 4574). Effectuated by exchange of notes at New Delhi March 9, 1961. Entered into force March 9, 1961.

Korea

Agreement providing for the furnishing of economic, technical, and related assistance with agreed minute and related exchange of notes. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Seoul February 8, 1961.

Entered into force: February 28, 1961.

Agreement relating to economic aid. Signed at Seoul December 10, 1948. TIAS 1908.

Terminated: February 28, 1961 (superseded by agreement of February 8, 1961, *supra*).

Paraguay

Agreement amending the agreement of April 4, 1957 (TIAS 3811), relating to duty-free entry and exemption from internal taxation on relief supplies and packages. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Asunción December 27, 1960, and March 7, 1961. Entered into force March 7, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Release issued prior to March 20 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 137 of March 15.

No.	Date	Subject
*145	3/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
146	3/20	Rusk: University of California.
147	3/21	Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) credentials (rewrite).
148	3/21	Rusk: news conference of March 20.
†149	3/21	Delegation to SEATO meeting (rewrite).
*150	3/23	Coombs sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
151	3/22	Gabon credentials (rewrite).
*152	3/22	Kennan sworn in as Ambassador to Yugoslavia (rewrite).
*153	3/23	Cultural exchange (Brazil).
154	3/23	Delegation to ECE 25th session (rewrite).
†155	3/23	Rusk: departure for SEATO meeting.
156	3/24	Williams: National Press Club.
†157	3/24	Delegation to Development Assistance Group meeting (rewrite).
158	3/24	Congolese educators begin training course.
159	3/24	ICA loan to Bolivia.
160	3/24	Negotiations for education program with Liberia.
*161	3/24	Cultural exchange (Iceland).
*162	3/24	Slater appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
*163	3/24	Isenbergh appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
164	3/25	Williams: message to All-African Peoples' Conference.

*Not printed.

†Held for later issue of the BULLETIN.

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January 1, 1961

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The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

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